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There is a growing consensus in the region that the 
Latin American economies should become more effi-
cient, more internationally competitive and less 
insulated from market forces, even if this restructur-
ing is achieved through more pragmatic and selec-
tive instruments than those usually proposed by the 
Centre. 
This economic restructuring is being frustrated 
by the heavy economic and social burden involved in 
transferring internal resources abroad to service the 
foreign debt. Attempts to confront the so-called 
"transfer problem" have been very costly due to both 
internal and external factors. The external environ-
ment has been hostile, involving grossly inadequate 
and costly finance, rigid conditionality, adverse trad-
ing conditions and world economic instability. 
Thus, concomitant with the serious domestic 
efforts being made in the debtor countries to restruc-
ture, the creditors must contribute with finance, a 
readiness to grant debt forgiveness for borrowers 
who are insolvent, more pragmatic conditionality, 
and more serious efforts to correct macroeconomic 
disequilibria in the North itself. Unless this is done, 
sporadic moratoria and more inward-looking eco-
nomic policies could be perceived by debtors as an 
attractive second-best solution to the region's 
problems. 
"Staff member of the KCLAC Economic Development 
Division. This is a revised version of a paper presented at 
the University of Pittsburgh's Bicentennial International 
Symposium on "Restructuring of Latin America", 12-13 
March 1987. A. Bianchi, R. Ffrench-Davis, C. Mesa Lago 
and J. Ramos provided extensive comments on an earlier 
draft, H. Assael, S. Astete, F. Fajnzylber,J. M alloy, M. Lazo 
and L. Willmore also contributed helpful comments, while 
G. Mundt and L.A. Santa Cruz provided valuable statistical 
assistance. 
Introduction 
Capitalist development is dynamic (Schumpeter, 
1980). Growing economies do not simply repro-
duce the prevailing productive structure, but 
rather undergo a constant transformation or res-
tructuring. While the process of restructuring, 
both social and economic, is present to some 
degree in all nations that experience sustained 
economic expansion, its importance is relatively 
more accentuated in the economic growth of 
societies at lower levels of development —those 
we usually term developing countries. 
In the post-war period Latin America under-
went important socio-economic transforma-
tions (ECLAC, 1979, pp. 3-26). The economic 
strategy underpinning the process has been 
characterized as "inward-oriented import substi-
tution". Although it has been pointed out that 
Latin America's transformation in the post-war 
period lagged behind some other countries 
which employed "an outward-oriented export-
led growth strategy" (Balassa and others, 1986, 
pp. 1-74), the region's economic performance 
was certainly respectable up until the 1980s, 
with an average annual growth of per capita 
product of slightly less than 3% between 1950 
and 1980. Since the explosion of the crisis in 
1982, however, economic activity has stagnated, 
and by 1986 per capita product was 8% below 
the level recorded in 1980 (table 1). 
By most estimates the 1980s will be a "lost 
decade" for Latin America in terms of economic 
growth and socio-economic development. While 
the region undeniably faced some unusually 
adverse external conditions at the outset of the 
1980s (high international interest rates, reces-
sion in the OECD countries, etc.), the severity 
and prolonged nature of the crisis suggests that 
the prevailing development strategy left most of 
the countries excessively vulnerable to unfavou-
rable shifts in external parameters and not well 
situated to respond dynamically to them. 
These circumstances have placed demands 
on the region to rethink its development stra-
tegy and make the necessary adjustments to con-
front the changing external environment. Some 
formulas emanating from the North suggest 
that the panacea is a fashionable outward-
oriented strategy based largely on exports, "cor-
rect", free market-determined prices, and 
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private initiative (Balassa and others, 1986). 
Others, even while sharing some of the goals of 
this formulation such as the need to increase 
domestic savings, raise productivity and interna-
tional competitiveness, expand export activity 
and rationalize the State, find it essentially 
overly simplistic (ECLAC, 1986b and Fishlow, 
1985, pp. 137-168). This latter analysis gives 
much greater attention to issues related to insti-
tutional development, growth of endogenous 
technological capacities, sectoral industrial 
strategies, exports of manufactures, selectivity in 
the use of policy instruments and incentives, 
government intervention in the market place, as 
well as normative questions of equity and 
democracy. 
Although there are important differences in 
their conception and policy mix, the aforementi-
oned two views on the future requirements of 
Latin America indisputably converge on the 
issue of a development crisis in the region and 
the need for a dramatic restructuring of the econ-
omies. However, this "crisis of development" 
and the need to pursue economic restructuring 
over the medium term is frequently oversha-
dowed by discussion of the "debt crisis" and the 
immediate need for external adjustment of the 
balance of payments. So much attention has 
focused on debt and adjustment because these 
are the aspects of the development crisis which 
involve the most immediate short-term links 
between North and South. On the one hand, the 
health of the North's private banks —the 
region's principal creditor— and of its financial 
system is influenced by how quickly Latin Amer-
ica adjusts its balance of payments to demands 
for repayment of its large US$380 billion foreign 
debt. On the other, as we will see later, the 
payment of debt service involves a huge outward 
transfer of resources from the region that drains 
resources needed for investment, socio-
economic restructuring and growth. 
This paper proposes to address the question 
of economic restructuring in Latin America by 
Table 1 
LATIN AMERICA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
Indicators 
Gross domestic product at market 
prices (index base year 1980 = 100) 
Population (millions of inhabitants) 
Per capita gross domestic product 
(index base year 1980 - 100) 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Consumer prices 
Terms of trade (goods) 
Purchasing power of exports of goods 
Current value of exports of goods 
Current value of imports of goods 
Exports of goods 
Imports of goods 
Trade balance (goods) 
Net payments of profits and interest 
Balance on current account 
Net movement of capital 
Global balance' 








































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary estimates subject to revision. 
Variation from December to December. 
f
 Includes net unrequited private transfer payments. 
Includes long and short-term capital, official unrequited transfer payments and errors and omissions. 
'Relates to the variation in international reserves (of reverse sign) plus counterpart items. 
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studying the dynamics of the outward transfer of 
resources being effected from debtor nations to 
creditor nations. The result will be to show that, 
independently of the debtor countries' domestic 
efforts, the policies of the creditors and their 
governments have decisively contributed to 
making the short-term economic adjustments 
needed to bring about an outward transfer 
extremely costly for Latin America, and have not 
been broadly supportive of the medium-term 
objective of economic restructuring. Indeed, the 
short-term adjustment process has been so 
costly that it might actually place in jeopardy the 
economic restructuring of the region that almost 
everyone admits is necessary. Thus, without a 
Since 1982 analysis of the Latin American eco-
nomic situation has centered largely on the ques-
tion of the external debt and adjustment. Viewed 
in its simplest and most commonly referred to 
form, the process of adjustment in a developing 
country normally involves a reduction (or elimi-
nation) of the current account deficit of the bal-
ance of payments, with corresponding 
reductions in the requirements for external 
finance and debt accumulation. The reduction of 
the negative current account balance can be 
voluntary, as when a country's authorities seek a 
lower deficit in order to accommodate a lower 
ex-ante "desired" annual level of external 
finance and indebtedness. Alternatively, the 
The aforementioned tension in the adjustment 
process expresses itself in the two major compo-
nents of a current account deficit: i) a financial 
component in the form of interest payments on 
the foreign debt and Ü) a trade component in the 
form of the balance of imports over exports.1 
The former involves a legal contract which 
creditors are disposed to enforce and therefore is 
more far-sighted policy in the creditor countries 
the efforts of Latin America to restructure its 
economies could be frustrated. 
The organization of this paper is as follows. 
Section I will examine the general nature of the 
transfer issue and the magnitude of Latin Ameri-
ca's transfers. Section II will focus primarily on 
those external factors that have most contrib-
uted to making these payments so difficult to 
effect and the reasons why the transfers have 
undermined the process of economic restructur-
ing. Finally, section III provides the conclusions 
and suggestions for a more appropriate policy 
focus. 
reduction of the current account balance may be a 
non-voluntary ex-post response to a lower avail-
able annual volume of external finance. (Deficits 
cannot occur unless they are validated by 
finance.) 
As we will see in more detail later, the reduc-
tion of Latin America's current account deficit 
—from US$41 billion in 1982 to an average of 
less than US$7 billion per annum in 1983-1986 
(table 1)— was largely non-voluntary. In cases 
of non-voluntary adjustment, analysis can be 
conveniently organized around the inherent ten • 
sion that arises between creditor and debtor 
when the former insists on a reduced financial 
commitment to the latter. 
theoretically rigid and not subject to compres-
sion. The latter, on the other hand, is theoreti-
cally flexible and responsive to domestic policy. 
'For the sake of exposition, we can momentarily assume that 
there is no direct foreign investment and therefore no profit 
remittances to be concerned about. In Latin America roughly 90£f 
of all factor payments contributing to the current account deficit 
take the form of interest payments. 
I 
External adjustment and resource transfers 
A. The unilateral external demand for an outward resource transfer: 
an overview 
Table 2 
LATIN AMERICA: FINANCIAL RESOURCE BALANCE (REGISTERED LOANS 
A N D DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT)" 
Average 
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Source: Calculated from the balance of payments series constructed by ECLAC's Division of Statistics and Quantitative Analysis. 
"All private and official creditors, except IMF. Note that net inflows exclude interest earned on deposits and loans placed abroad, and disbursements of grants and other transfers. The 
errors and omissions line of the balance of payments is also excluded. 
^Nominal data were deflated by an index of unit prices for imports of goods and services. 
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Thus, in circumstances where interest payments 
are treated as sacrosanct, the weight of adjust-
ment really falls on the trade deficit (and hence 
the domestic economic parameters of the bor-
rower) rather than on the current account deficit 
as such. 
Foreign creditors decisively influence the 
degree of tension between the financial and 
trade components of the current account. During 
the expansive phase of a credit cycle new lending 
by private creditors can often exceed annual 
interest payments and amortization on the debt 
owed to them. In effect, the private credit system 
as a whole makes no effective "demand" for 
payment by the borrower; debt service is accom-
modated easily through a semi-automatic roll-
over of payment obligations and, moreover, 
additional capital is typically made available to 
support a trade deficit. In these circumstances, 
there is a positive transfer of resources from 
creditor to debtor and no apparent tension 
between the financial and trade components of 
the current account.2 
The above situation could be favourable for a 
developing country because the creditors' posi-
tive transfer —if not offset by a net outflow on 
other types of transactions— permits invest-
ment to exceed internal savings, providing 
important stimulus for growth and develop-
ment. Indeed, a protracted period in which for-
eign resource transfers are positive is 
traditionally considered to be a normal and desir-
able stage in the process of development.' 
Throughout the 1970s and in the early years 
of the 1980s Latin America enjoyed a positive 
resource balance on the total of registered for-
lin theory some tension should always arise from the so-
called "discipline of the marketplace"', which rests on the notion 
that private creditors continuously evaluate the creditworthiness 
of their clients and effectively translate that evaluation into their 
credit decisions. Private banks have in fact been found to carry out 
creditworthiness evaluation, and employ as a prime indicator the 
rate of growth of exports. (Group of Thirty, 1982, p. 41.) However, 
there is also evidence that during most of the 1970s the so-called 
discipline of the marketplace was not felt by most Latin American 
borrowers, because of deficiencies in the banks' creditworthiness 
analysis and/or difficulties in institutionally translating that eva-
luation into credit decisions. Indeed, the credit environment ¡n the 
1970s can be best characterized as having been permissive and full 
of deceptive signals as to the long-term availability and cost of 
finance. (See Devlin, 1986.) 
(One of the best expositions of the classic debt cycle hypothe-
sis of a developing country is still Avramovic and others (1964). 
Also seeOhlin (1966). 
eign loan and direct foreign investment transac-
tions. The positive balance was extraordinarily 
large in both nominal and real terms and had 
most of its origin in loan transactions (table 2, 
column 8). The dynamic loan account in turn 
basically reflects the fact that during this period 
private international banks initiated their mas-
sive penetration of Latin American markets, 
expanding lending in the region at a rate of more 
than 25% per annum (Morgan Guaranty Trust 
Co., 1983, p. 6). 
It can be expected that at any given time 
private creditors may view the existing trade 
deficits and financing of the borrowing country 
as excessive, calling forth adjustment on the part 
of the debtor. However, as long as the financial 
system does not demand effective payment of 
debts, —i.e., new net lending remains above 
interest payments— trade deficits can still be 
run and resource transfers for investment and 
growth remain positive. The need to reduce 
trade deficits in response to tighter external 
financing conditions is not an uncommon event 
in the debt cycle of a developing country. 
Moreover, if the earlier financing exceeded the 
absorptive capacity of the borrower with respect 
to efficient investment, somewhat lower financ-
ing, as part of a programmed reduction of the 
current account deficit, could be a helpful form of 
discipline consistent with a strengthening of 
overall economic performance. 
It is also possible that the net annual financ-
ing may fall below levels required for the roll-
over, or refinance, of interest payments. The 
situation may be part of a natural and voluntary 
process, as in the case of a developing debtor 
nation which, through the sagacious deployment 
of earlier loans, has reached a stage in develop-
ment where the internal savings and foreign 
trade gaps have been closed, making resources 
available to effectively pay all or part of the 
interest on the foreign debt. Alternatively, the 
reduction in available finance may be imposed 
unilaterally on the borrower by its creditors, 
which for any number of reasons begin to 
"demand" effective payment of interest (and 
perhaps even amortization) on the debt. An 
unexpected demand for payment can be very 
disruptive to the process of savings, investment 
and growth in the debtor country and fully 
exposes the tension between the financial and 
trade components of the current account deficit, 
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which during the upswing of the credit cycle had 
been hidden by the veil of abundant and uncondi-
tional finance. 
Once the private creditors make effective 
demands for payment of interest, the full weight 
of adjustment must theoretically fall on the flexi-
ble trade balance, because the deficit on factor 
services (interest payments) is a rigid contract. 
Unless financing is available from the country's 
accumulated reserves or other official compensa-
tory sources, the trade balance must register a 
surplus equivalent to that part of the interest 
payments not covered by new loans from the 
creditors. Meanwhile, the domestic counterparts 
of the trade surplus are that internal savings 
must be greater than investment and domestic 
absorption less than the product. In these cir-
cumstances the flow of resources reverses itself, 
as the debtor must now transfer net resources to 
¡ts private creditors in an amount equivalent to 
the trade surplus and the excess of internal sav-
ings over investment. 
Any non-voluntary transfer of resources 
from debtor to creditor is difficult and raises 
tensions between the two parties. But when the 
non-voluntary transfer occurs at an unnatural 
stage of development —i.e., when there is a 
genuine savings-investment gap to be filled for 
the purpose of development— the situation can 
be particularly delicate. 
B. Latin America and the outward resource transfer 
In recent years Latin America has been effecting 
large and protracted net payments to its private 
bank creditors that are largely non-voluntary 
and considered by many to be premature with 
respect to the region's stage of development. 
The general phenomenon appeared in 1982, 
although for some countries it began earlier. 
The effect of those net payments on the total 
resource balance for loans and direct foreign 
investments can be observed in table 2. There it 
can be seen that the average annual resource 
balance for the region as a whole in 1982-1,985 
was negative to the tune of US$35 billion. 
Table 3 presents the same balance for 10 indi-
Table 3 
TEN LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES: RESOURCE BALANCE OF REGISTERED 





































































































Source: Calculated from data in the balance-of-payments series prepared by ECLAC's Division of Statistics and Quantitative Analysis. 
"The sum of DFI +L - U, where DFI is net direct foreign investment, L isshortandmediumtermloansnetof amortization and U is profit 
remittances on direct investments and gross interest payments on the foreign debt. The balance is analogous to column 8 of table 2. 
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Table 4 
COMPARISON OF LATIN AMERICAS 
NEGATIVE RESOURCE BALANCE ON 
REGISTERED FOREIGN FINANCIAL 
TRANSACTIONS WITH THE WAR 



















































Source: Germany and France: Calculated from data in Machlup 
(1976, pp. 378-386) and Reisen (1986). Latin America: 
Estimated from data in the balance-of-payments and 
national income data series of ECLAC's Division of 
Statistics and Quantitative Analysis. 
aIn view of the dates of the German and French cases, data and 
comparisons should be viewed with appropriate caution and 
taken as estimates of rough orders of magnitude. 
The donominator is national income in the case of Germany and 
France and GDP in the case of Latin America. Note that GDP is 
larger than national income for debtor nations. 
'Goods and services for Latin America and presumably just goods 
for France and Germany. 
Data on bank debt are drawn from the statistics of the Bank for 
International Settlements in Basle. Their reporting system tends 
to undetestimate the banks' assets so that this column may 
underestimate the respective percentage of bank debt in each 
country. 
'War reparations of Fr. 5 000 million as part of the 1871 peace 
treaty of Frankfurt which ended the Franco-Prussian War. 
'War reparations to victorious nations of RM 10 720 million in 
currency and payments in kind as formulated in the 1919 Treaty 
of Versailles. 
'Net payments to foreign capital calculated as DFI +1 - U, where 
DFI is net direct foreign investment; I, is short- and medium-
term loans net of amortization and; U is profit remittances plus 
gross interest payments on foreign debt. 
vidual Latin American countries. Only Colombia 
—a country which clearly was cautious about 
going into debt with the banks during the 
1970s— has escaped a persistent negative 
balance.4 
By any measure Latin America's negative 
resource balance with its foreign creditors and 
investors is large. It is estimated to have been 
equivalent, on average, to roughly 5% of the 
region's GDP and 30% of its export earnings 
over the period 1982-1985. Moreover, the 
cumulative negative balance over those 4 years 
(US3S139 billion) is more than double the cumul-
ative positive balance during the previous 11 
years (table 2). 
The negative balance on the aforementioned 
capital transactions is a rough indicator of the 
foreign creditors' effective demand —taken as a 
whole— for an outward resource transfer. The 
Latin American debtors' compliance with that 
demand is to a large degree non-voluntary. It is 
this non-voluntary character which makes for an 
interesting comparison with two historically 
famous transfer cases involving war reparations: 
France in the 1880s after the Franco-Prussian 
War and Germany's payments to victorious 
nations after World War I (table 4).5 Here it can 
be seen that the magnitude of the demand for a 
transfer in terms of the Latin American debtor 
nations' income and exports is large: it is 
approximately double that of Germany's and it is 
roughly comparable to France's. Going beyond 
4Up until 1980 Colombia —in contrast to most other Latin 
American countries— was a very cautious user of bank loans. In his 
study of developing country borrowers in the Eurocurrency market 
Wellons (1976) classified Colombia as an "ambivalent" borrower. 
However, during 1980-1981 the country became a more aggressive 
borrower, in part because of the monetarist economic orientation 
of the Turbay administration. When the crisis broke out in Latin 
America in 1982 Colombia became engulfed in the negative exter-
nalities created by payment problems in neighbouring countries 
and found access to new credit exceedingly difficult. Nevertheless, 
it is the only major Latin American debtor to avoid a need for a 
rescheduling of its foreign obligations. 
'Of course, war reparations are essentially different from 
debt service. Debts are voluntarily contracted, while war repara-
tions are imposed. In theory, debts should generate a return on 
capital that make them self-liquidating; there is no such dynamic in 
war reparations. However, if the ex-post return on capital is not 
sufficient to service the debt —as is the case in most Latin Ameri-
can countries— the creditors' insistence on effective payment 
represents a type of lien on the economy that, in terms of its effects, 
may be not entirely dissimilar to a demand for war reparations. 
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Table 5 
CUMULATIVE T R A D E SURPLUS OF FRANCE, GERMANY A N D LATIN AMERICA 
































































































Source: See table 4. 
"For France and Germany, the denominator is national income, whereas in the case of Latin America it is GDP. For a developing country, 
GDP is normally larger than national income. 
''The first column corresponds to exports of goods and the second column to exports of goods and services. 
cThe increase in reserves is divided by the trade surplus. Note that the trade surplus is a faithful reflection of the transfer when there is no 
increase in reserves. Only in the case of Peru is there a very large increase in reserves. 
Table 6 
L A T I N A M E R I C A : T R A D E SURPLUS (GOODS A N D SERVICES) AS A P E R C E N T A G E 







































































Source: Calculated from data in the balance-of-payments series prepared by ECLAC's Division of Statistics and Quantitative Analysis. 
"Factor payments comprise net interest payments on the foreign debt and profit remittances on foreign direct investments. 
Very preliminary figures. 
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the regional average, it can be seen that the 
individual Latin American countries facing rela-
tively high demands for a transfer are Argentina, 
Brazil (in terms of exports), Costa Rica (in terms 
of income), Mexico and Venezuela. Moreover, 
with the exception of Costa Rica, the countries 
facing the greatest relative demand for a transfer 
are those with proportionally more debt with 
private banks. 
While the creditors' effective demand for a 
transfer from Latin America in the 1980s gener-
ally compares unfavourably with the transfers 
demanded from nations defeated in war, the real 
burden of payments apparently compares even 
more unfavourably. The real burden depends 
partly on the degree to which the required 
transfer can be financed with other sources of 
foreign exchange. For instance, during 1925-
1928 Germany received foreign loans well in 
excess of the requirements for war reparation 
payments. Only during 1929-1932 did those out-
ward payments actually exceed the inward flow 
of resources made available through foreign bor-
rowing. In the case of Latin America, during 
1982-1985 it was able to finance part of the net 
payments to creditors through a draw down of 
international reserves, a small annual inflow of 
grants, and roughly US$10 billion per year 
(average) from interest earnings on deposits and 
loan placements abroad —although for the 
region as a whole all this finance was partially 
offset by a negative Errors and Omissions line in 
the balance of payments averaging some US$3 
billion per year. 
If financing available from other sources is 
greater than the required transfer, a country can 
still run a trade deficit while effecting payments. 
In contrast, if other income falls short of the 
required transfer, the payments can be made 
Cases of non-voluntary transfers of resources are 
generally controversial. The French transfers 
effected in the last century were accompanied by 
violent social disturbances and economic disloca-
tions (Keynes, 1929a, p. 406). The German 
only by converting a trade deficit into a trade 
surplus. In other words, as described earlier, a 
real effective transfer creates a tension in the 
external accounts in the form of an excess of 
exports over imports. We have seen that, in the 
case of Germany, it did not have to generate a 
trade surplus until 1929- France ran a surplus 
throughout 1872-1875, while Latin America has 
had a trade surplus since the outbreak of the 
crisis in 1982. However, the required trade sur-
plus in Latin America has been roughly double 
the magnitude of that registered in France and 
Germany, whether measured as a percentage of 
income or of exports (table 5). 
At the level of individual Latin American 
countries, one can see from the same table how 
their trade surplus compared with the two 
nations defeated in war. Those countries which 
compare quite unfavourably with the two cases 
of war reparations are Argentina, Brazil, Ecua-
dor, Mexico, Uruguay and Venezuela.6 
While Latin America's transfers are 
obviously extremely large, they still have gener-
ally fallen short of the required payments for 
interest and profit remittances on foreign capital 
(tableó), not to mention amortization of the 
debt. Thus, even after effecting a large outward 
transfer to creditors the region's debt has not 
been reduced: indeed, it has continued to grow, 
albeit at rates far below those registered up until 
1982 (table I). 
''The trade surplus is an accurate picture of an effective 
outward transfer to the degree that there is no significant accumu-
lation of international reserves. The last column of table 5 shows 
that in 1982-1985, for the region as a whole, there was no signifi-
cant reserve accumulation lii-j-rii the trade surplus. At the level 
of our 10 selected countries, only Brazil, Venezuela and Peru used 
any noticeable part of the trade surplus to accumulate international 
reserves. Thus in these three cases the trade surplus overstates the 
transfer, but this is of an important magnitude only in Peru. 
transfers after World War I, although appar-
ently less burdensome than the French case, set 
off a long and famous debate ( found in 
Moggridge, 1983, pp. 451-480) over the 
"transfer problem" and how best to deal with it. 
II 
The degree of tension in the transfer of resources 
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Table 7 







































































































































Source: Calculated from national accounts and balance-of-payments data prepared by ECLAC's Division of Statistics and Quantitative 
Analysis. 
"Goods and services. 
Latin America's transfer is today the subject of 
heated debate and at times has given rise to 
social unrest in a number of countries. 
Broadly speaking, classical transfers in the 
form of war reparations conceptually have two 
different stages: first there is a budgetary phase 
in which a government must tax away resources 
from its citizens, and second there is the transla-
tion of those resources into foreign exchange 
through the generation of a trade surplus. Dur-
ing the great debate in 1929 about the German 
transfer problem some economists thought that 
once the budgetary problem was resolved, the 
transfer phase followed so automatically, due to 
the natural working of market forces, that in 
practice it was not really a phase at all.7 Keynes 
(1929b), on the other hand, argued that an auto-
matic transfer was not so simple and could be 
hindered by a number of internal and external 
factors, although he stressed that he was not 
positing the technical impossibility of the 
transfer, only that it could be "politically and 
humanly difficult" (Keynes, 1929a, p. 405). 
Latin America's transfer of resources has 
some clear technical analogies with the classical 
war reparations cases. A budgetary issue cer-
tainly exists because most of the foreign debt was 
contracted by the State; moreover, foreign banks 
unquestionably pressured debtor governments 
to provide, in one form or another, ex-post gua-
rantees on private sector debts that the banks 
were originally willing to grant without any pub-
lic guarantees.8 
Thus most of the transfer has had to come 
directly or indirectly out of government budgets. 
Reisen (1986, pp. 151-152) has shown that 
Latin America's budgetary phase was generally 
'See Machlup (1976, pp. 396-416) for a review of the logic. 
^ h e insistence on ex-post guarantees has no justification 
from the standpoint of conventional economic criteria. The banks 
supposedly evaluated the risk of default of lending to private 
entities without public guarantees, and charged the appropriate 
premiums, when they originally authorized the loan. To demand a 
guarantee after that risk materializes is entirely arbitrary, unless 
the banks are willing to pay the State guarantor an insurance 
premium. And this insurance premium would have to be quite high 
—indeed infinite in some cases— because many of the private 
sector debts are quite simply bad. The banks generally have not 
paid premiums for the State guarantees, although a token fee was 
granted to the Government of Chile in its third round of debt 
rescheduling in 1985, when it reluctantly renewed its guarantor 
status on private debts. 
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not resolved during the 1982-1985 adjustment 
process because governments found it "impossi-
ble" to enforce fully the required restrictive fiscal 
and credit policy. Deficits resulting from the 
transfer burden and other factors were therefore 
financed by borrowing from the domestic bank-
ing system with inflationary consequences. 
According to Reisen, this fiscal dilemma of the 
debtor governments "will surprise only those 
who are not aware of the huge budgetary burden 
involved" (in the transfer). 
But aside from the budgetary problem it is 
also evident that the transfer phase as such has 
not been easy either. Indeed, the large transfers 
(via trade surpluses) referred to earlier have 
absorbed a very large share of the domestic sav-
ings of the borrowers, and have been realized 
largely at the expense of sharply reduced domes-
tic investment, import volumes and economic 
growth (tables 7 and 8). Moreover the high 
social costs of the economic depression are quite 
unsettling (World Bank, 1986). The transfer 
problem is related both to internal and external 
factors. 
As regards the internal factors that have 
hindered a smooth adjustment to the external 
demand for a transfer, a recent paper (Bianchi, 
Devlin and Ramos, 1987) has examined them in 
detail as part of an evaluation of Latin America's 
adjustment process over the period 1982-1986. 
The study concludes that the domestic effort to 
adjust has been considerable, but that neverthe-
less domestic factors have clearly contributed to 
the costliness of the economic adjustment 
needed to effect a transfer of resources. The 
major domestic factors cited are: 
— The high level of the foreign debt in terms of 
exports (2.5 in 1981 compared to 1.0 in 
South Korea); 
— The high percentage of the debt contracted 
with a floating interest rate (66% versus 
33% for South Korea); 
— In the case of some countries, there was 
inefficient use of borrowed resources during 
the 1970s, as reflected in high capital/output 
ratios, failed projects, conspicuous consump-
tion and over-dimensioned military sectors; 
— The low levels of exports relative to GDP 
(13% compared to 38% in South Korea), 
which provided a low base on which to gen-
erate trade surpluses through increased sales 
of domestic products abroad; 
Table 8 
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Source: Calculated from national accounts data prepared by 
ECLAC's Division of Statistics and Quantitative Analysis. 
"At constant 1980 prices. 
— A high dependence on primary commodity 
exports (80% of the total), which have rela-
tively low supply and demand elasticities; 
— Domestic policies which, while usually mov-
ing economies in the right direction, some-
times suffered from sluggishness, 
incoherence and lack of continuity. This was 
due to flawed conceptions and/or weak State 
bureaucracies, which were unable to fully 
carry out the selective policies that could 
have ameliorated some of the costs of adjust-
ment; and 
— Capital flight which, while difficult to define 
and quantify, was a problem in many coun-
tries, particularly Mexico, Venezuela and 
Argentina. 
Notwithstanding these limitations of 
domestic policy, it is also evident that the exter-
nal environment for making a transfer was 
extremely adverse. Indeed, Bianchi, Devlin and 
Ramos (1987) conclude that the hostile external 
environment was the most general weak link in 
the adjustment process and frustrated the efforts 
of the debtor countries to adjust at minimum 
social cost. The rest of this section will therefore 
concentrate its attention on these external fac-
tors. Moreover, in examining them in more 
detail, we will find that they were mostly directly 
and indirectly related to creditor and creditor 
government policy. 
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A. The insufficiency and high cost of finance 
1. The role of finance in adjustment: 
theory 
Unless a country is at a very mature stage of 
development, it would presumably prefer to 
avoid an outward transfer of financial resources; 
that way trade deficits could be run, investment 
could remain higher than internal savings, and 
growth could be accelerated. If obliged to under-
take a premature transfer, the adjustment to this 
situation should be ideally as socially efficient as 
possible. 
In simple terms, for an adjustment process 
to be socially efficient, the trade surplus which is 
necessary to effect financial transfers must be 
mostly "produced" through a rise in savings and 
in the output of tradeable goods —i.e., exports 
and import substitutes— rather than "created" 
through a reduction in domestic expenditure, 
output and hence imports. When a trade surplus 
is "produced" a nation's total absorption will 
necessarily be less than its output, since part of 
what is produced must be turned over to foreign 
creditors, but at least economic activity and 
employment remain robust and standards of liv-
ing can theoretically still rise. However, when a 
trade surplus is "created" through an economic 
recession, not only must total absorption be less 
than the domestic product, but economic activ-
ity, employment and standards of living must 
fall for the purpose of squeezing foreign 
exchange out of the economy for payments on 
the debt. 
The problem confronting an efficient adjust-
ment is that to produce more tradeable goods, 
resources must be switched, or reallocated, to 
this activity. Economists, to borrow from 
Keynes' insight (1929b, p. 5), often think of 
economies as if they were a liquid; in practice, 
however, they are more viscous in the short term 
as there are definite rigidities in the reorienta-
tion of internal expenditure and production. 
These rigidities exist even in the most developed 
economies (hence the discussion of thej-curve in 
the question of the reduction of the U.S. trade 
deficit), and are usually considerably more pro-
nounced in more disarticulated economies such 
as those found in underdeveloped regions (and 
are further aggravated if borrowed/lent resour-
ces were deployed poorly). In other words, for an 
adjustment to be socially efficient and based 
mostly on the production of tradeable goods it 
must be gradual. This requirement increases 
proportionately with the level of underdevelop-
ment and structural problems of the adjusting 
economy. Thus, while shock treatment can be 
effective for an efficient stabilization pro-
gramme, it can never be compatible with an 
efficient adjustment programme (Bianchi, 
Devlin and Ramos, 1987). Efficient adjustment 
simply is constrained by the factor of time. 
Consequently, while an economy is going 
through the process of reallocating resources to 
the production of tradeable goods it often needs 
considerable amounts of compensatory financ-
ing. In other words, initially financing must rise 
above that which private markets might feel 
naturally comfortable with; later, when adjust-
ment policies and the production of tradeable 
goods (and a trade surplus) begin to take hold, 
that financing can be gradually pulled back.9 If 
adequate financing is not available to support 
the adjustment programme, it cannot be effi-
cient. In these circumstances the adjustment will 
be largely based on a compression of domestic 
expenditure and economic activity, which in turn 
leads to reduced imports and lower trade and 
current account deficits. 
Outward transfers of resources that are 
squeezed from an economy via recessionary 
adjustment are perverse in general, but espe-
cially so for developing countries where the 
opportunity cost of lost income is presumably 
greater than that in wealthy and developed coun-
tries. This type of adjustment is negative in 
character because it unnecessarily weakens the 
debtor country and its productive capacity 
through a deep and/or prolonged recession that 
indiscriminately eats into the productive muscle 
of the economy as well as the fat. National 
resources potentially available for the produc-
tion of tradeable goods and a trade surplus lie 
'The transitory boost in financing required for expansive 
adjustment is nicely analysed inSelowsky and Van der Tak{ 1986). 
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idle because a scarcity of foreign exchange blocks 
the purchase of complementary imported 
inputs. Moreover, recessionary adjustment prej-
udices the growth of savings and investment 
(including investment in human capital) that is 
so necessary in cases where economic restructur-
ing is vital in order to produce new types of 
tradeable goods and to improve international 
competitiveness through productivity gains 
rather than falling real wages. The payment of 
debt in the midst of a situation where an econ-
omy is stagnating or contracting also exacerbates 
the tension between creditor and debtor that 
inevitably occurs when a trade account is pres-
sured by requirements for factor payments. 
In sum, transfers based on recessionary 
adjustment are so perverse because payment is 
made at the expense of the present and future 
productive capacity of the borrower. Moreover, 
they are especially damaging when circumstan-
ces demand an important restructuring of the 
debtor economy's productive structure, as 
opposed to a mere expansion along a path which 
is similar to the existing production pattern. In 
contrast, with appropriate time and finance, co-
operative debtors can be made to efficiently pro-
duce the trade surplus needed to pay debts. In any 
perspective other than a short-sighted one this is 
clearly a more satisfactory solution for both cred-
itor and debtor. 
2. External finance in practice; 
the pro-cyclical retreat of creditors 
We have just seen that socially efficient adjust-
ment demands adequate finance. But in the case 
of Latin America, there was an even stronger 
case for financing the adjustment process 
because the crisis itself was widely diagnosed in 
the North as one of ¡(liquidity, not of insolvency 
(Cline, 1984a; Sprinkel, 1984). If Latin America 
was indeed illiquid at the outset of the crisis, 
financing a systemic regional adjustment prob-
lem made eminent sense for the creditors too, 
for without a critical mass of external finance 
there were serious risks of generating a vicious 
circle of recession and negative expectations 
which could cause an initial condition of illiquid-
ity to degenerate into one of insolvency. 
These risks are unfortunately looming 
nearer than ever. The financing of adjustment 
has been extremely tight, even by orthodox 
standards. The latter employ a relatively restric-
tive criterion for financing adjustment: only 
deficits due to transitory shocks merit financing, 
while those due to permanent shocks must be 
adjusted to. However, a recent study by Ground 
(1986, p. 78) has found that during 1982-1985 
external finance covered only 37%, 25%, 36% 
and 16% of the respective annual apparent tran-
sitory components of the deficits of the non-oil 
exporters. The effect of the underfinancing was 
a massive "over-adjustment". 
As can be seen in table 9, the combination of 
normal internal rigidities and abnormally low 
external finance caused adjustment in the first 
two years to be disproportionately based on a 
near free-fall of import volumes, with its conse-
quent negative effects on economic growth. In 
the next biennium export volumes were gener-
ally better, while import volumes slowed their 
fall, or even rose. This, coupled with the reap-
pearance of albeit extremely modest growth of 
the GDP, led some to conclude that the debt 
problem was finally beginning to resolve itself. 
In 1986, however, adjustment fatigue in the deb-
tor countries contributed to a decisive upward 
shift in import volumes; although this stimu-
lated modest economic growth, export volumes 
failed to keep the pace established in 1984-1985. 
The result of this erratic path is that after five 
years of arduous adjustment, per capita GDP is 
still below 1980 levels for most countries, and as 
highlighted in a recent ECLAC report (1986a, 
pp. 7-8), at the end of 1986 most indicators of 
most countries' debt burden (debt/exports; 
interest payments/exports, etc.) were approxi-
mately as bad as, or worse than, they were at the 
outset of the crisis. 
The first major factor behind the paucity of 
financing relates to the pro-cyclical retreat of the 
region's private creditors. As seen in table 2, net 
registered medium- and long-term lending to 
Latin America fell from an average of US$25 
billion per annum in 1978-1981 to only US$14 
billion per annum in 1983-1985. The contraction 
of nearly 50% in lending was due largely to a 
retreat by private banks. Data from the Bank for 
International Settlements (1983) show that the 
banks had expanded their assets in the region at 
an annual average rate of about 26% per annum 
between mid-1978 and mid-1982. However, 
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with the outbreak of the crisis in August of the 
latter year, lending collapsed: the same BIS 
(1985, and 1986abc) data indicate that the banks 
claims in the region rose by only 4% in 1983,2% 
in 1984 and 3% in 1985. Moreover, preliminary 
data for 1986 suggest that claims did not grow at 
all in that year and perhaps fell in absolute 
terms. 
An examination of U.S. banking, where 
there is relatively more openness with data, is 
illustrative of the nature of the retreat of the 
banks. Here it can be found that over the period 
June 1982-March 1986 U.S. banks actually 
reduced their total exposure in Latin America by 
2%. This represents the net effect of a 6% 
expansion by the country's 9 big money centre 
banks, coupled with a 15% contraction in the 
exposure of the remaining small and medium-
sized institutions (table 10). At the level of indi-
vidual countries, over the last four years only 
Table 9 
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Source: Calculated from data provided by ECLAC s Division of Statistics and Quantitative Analysis. 
"Average annual rate. 
Very preliminary estimate. 
Table 10 
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Source: Calculated from U.S. Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (1982 and 1986). 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE TRANSFER PROBLEM / R. Devlin 89 
Brazil has experienced any noticeable expansion 
of net lending from U.S. institutions: 16%, giv-
ing a modest average annual rate of 4%. 
The different trends among U.S. banks 
reflect the conflicting interests of the institu-
tions. The big banks are very heavily exposed in 
Latin America vis-à-vis their capital and there-
fore have been more inclined to lend for the 
partial refinance of interest payments in order to 
avoid default. Most of the other lenders are much 
less exposed in the region and therefore were 
willing and able to pull out of the region when 
any opportunity presented itself.10 
Indeed, this conflict of interests —which is 
general in the world banking system— was only 
assuaged, and an even more severe collapse of 
lending avoided, by the imaginative policy of the 
IMF and its then Managing Director, J. de 
Larosière. In order to avoid a wholesale panic 
among the banks, and consequent massive 
defaults by the debtors, in mid-1982 the IMF 
began to act as a "catalyst" for private funds by 
conditioning its willingness to monitor standby 
programmes in the debtor countries with an 
ex-ante commitment from the banks to support 
those programmes with specific quantities of 
new loans —termed non-voluntary lending. The 
original formula called for the banks to expand 
their portfolio by 7% per annum —which in the 
first round of reschedulings in 1982/1983 would 
have allowed for refinancing of roughly half of 
the interest payments to the banks." This, 
coupled with IMF lending and the banks' resche-
duling of amortization and maintenance of 
short-term credit lines, was the creditors' contri-
bution to the debtors' adjustment process.12 
New forced lending from the banks totalled 
some US$14 billion during the first roundof the 
rescheduling exercises. However, we saw earlier 
that the actual expansion of the banks' exposure 
was less than 1%\ this was due to the ability of 
many banks to pull out of other types of lending, 
especially short-term lines of credit. We have 
l0At the outset of the crisis, loans by U.S. banks to Latin 
America represented about 130% of their capital; however, for the 
top 9 banks the figure was 181%. Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. 
(1984, p. 4) and Bank for International Settlements ( 1986d, p. 2). 
1
 'For more detailed analysis of the rescheduling exercises see 
ECLAC (1985, pp. 47-98); Brau and others (198*) and Dillion 
(1985). 
"For more analysis un the relationship between the IMF and 
the banks see liCLAC (1985), pp. 76-77 and pp. 85-86. 
also observed that in subsequent rounds of 
rescheduling bank lending has fallen off sharply 
from the original 7% formula, and it dried up 
altogether in 1986. 
In sum, the innovative arrangements for 
non-voluntary bank lending cum rescheduling of 
amortization were clearly successful in terms of 
staving off defaults, big losses for the banks, and 
disruptions in world financial markets. They 
were dramatically less successful, however, in 
terms of supporting efficient adjustment in the 
debtor countries. 
The second major factor in the paucity of 
financing was the inability of governments and 
official lenders to fill in the gap left by the 
retreating banks. The pro-cyclical behaviour of 
the private banks during the crisis really should 
have come as no surprise, since private capital 
often behaves that way. Indeed, Bretton Woods' 
public lending institutions were created in part 
to counterbalance this pro-cyclical tendency of 
private capital and thereby provide more stabil-
ity for the world economy. However, during the 
1960s and 1970s authorities in the OECD coun-
tries oversaw a hyper-expansion of the pro-
cyclical component of the world financial system 
(private banks), coupled with an atrophying of 
its anti-cyclical components —as witnessed by 
the fact that at the outset of the crisis IMF quotas 
were equivalent to 4% of the annual value of 
world trade, compared to 10% in 1970 (Cline, 
1984b, p. 124). The structural weakness of the 
world financial system is illustrated by the fol-
lowing fact: between 1981 and 1983 the com-
mercial banks' net lending to the world's non-oil 
developing countries fell from US$51 billion in 
1981 to only US$17 billion in 1983, while the 
IMF could boost its lending over the same period 
only from US$6 billion to US$10 billion 
(Feinberg, 1985, p. 29). Overall, the net 
transfers from the Bretton Woods twins to Latin 
America have been tiny compared with the with-
drawal of the banks. What is most incredible, 
however, is that in 1986 the IMF became a net 
recipient of resources from the region (table 11). 
The third factor in the scarcity of financing 
was the capital flight we referred to earlier. In 
effect, such financing as became available was 
sometimes partially eroded in its effect by a 
simultaneous outflow of private capital to north-
ern financial centres (this outflow was voluntary 
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at the private level and presumably non-
voluntary at the public level). The existence of 
capital flight clearly undermined the legitimacy 
of new lending to the region. 
Capital flight can undoubtedly be attributed 
mainly to domestic dynamics in the debtor coun-
tries. However, external factors clearly compli-
cated the problem. On the one hand, the massive 
procyclical retreat of private creditors, and the 
consequent collapse of economic activity ¡n the 
debtor countries, had a destabilizing effect and 
aggravated —and indeed validated— any nega-
tive expectations of private domestic capital. 
Second, as the late Carlos Diaz-Alejandro (1984, 
pp. 377-380) pointed out, many foreign private 
banks and financial institutions were accompli-
ces of capital flight as competitive pressures 
induced them to actively solicit deposits from 
private economic agents in the region. 
3. The cost of credit 
The adjustment process was also handicapped by 
the extremely high cost of credit. First, and most 
importantly, the tight monetary policy prevail-
ing in the OECD countries helped to cause world 
interest rates, which were applied to Latin 
America's floating-rate debt, to rise to record 
levels; this acted simultaneously as a factor in the 
need to adjust, as well as —given the theoretical 
rigidity of factor payments— in the costliness of 
the process. Table 12 shows that LIBOR reached 
record levels in the 1980s. It peaked at an aver-
age of 16.5% in 1981 and was at an average of 
10.7% in 1982-1985. In 1986 the average was 
6.7%, with LIBOR hovering around 6% at end-
year —its lowest level since 1977. On balance, 
then, LIBOR tended to decline over the period of 
adjustment. 
Any decline in this rate represented marked 
savings for the region: indeed, in recent years a 
one-point drop in LIBOR has represented a sav-
ing of about US$2.5 billion in interest payments 
(ECLAC, 1986c, p. 10). The net effect of declin-
ing interest rates on the region's interest pay-
ments (taking into account the growing stock of 
debt) was as follows (excluding Panama), US$ 
billions: 1981 (32); 1982 (41); 1983 (36); 1984 
(39); 1985 (37); and 1986 (32). 
While nominal rates declined and eventually 
reached an ostensibly reasonable level (6%) in 
1986, real rates remained persistently high. The 
real LIBOR, measured by the industrial countries' 
rate of inflation, averaged 5% in 1982-1986. 
This compares with an average real rate of zero 
between 1971-1980 and a long-term historical 
rate of around 2%. 
But this tells only part of the story. The 
burden of interest payments depends too on the 
dollar value of the debtors' exports. When this is 
falling, every dollar of interest paid costs more in 
terms of what the country sells abroad. Latin 
America's exports suffered generally declining 
prices during the adjustment period. As a conse-
quence, the average annual real interest rate 
from the debtors' perspective was an extraordi-
narily high 17% for the period 1982-1986. This 
compares with an average of -4% during the 
period 1971-1980 when most of the region's 
foreign debt was contracted (table 12). 
A second factor is that private banks aggra-
vated the problem of the cost of credit by jacking 
up their spreads and commissions, as well as 
Table 11 
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Source: Richard Feinberg and Edmar Bacha, "When supply and demand don t Intersect: Latin America and the Bretton Woods Institutions 
in the 1980s", Paper presented to a Seminar on the world economy and Latin American development, sponsored by SELA in 
Caracas, Venezuela, May 1987. 
"Balance of net disbursements and interest payments. 
Net disbursements only. 
'Fiscal year. 
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Table 12 































































































































Source; Calculated from data in Morgan Guaranty Trust, World Financial Markets, and IMF, International Financial Statistics, various 
issues. 
" 180 days. 
shortening amortization periods, on rescheduled 
debt and fresh credit during the first round of the 
rescheduling exercises in 1982/1983. The nego-
tiated cost of credit (based on spreads, amortiza-
tion period and commissions) rose in most 
debtor countries by between 100% and 250% 
(table 13)- This rise —which has been shown to 
have little or no economic justification (Devlin, 
1985, pp. 74-89)— was apparently not seriously 
questioned by the IMF and served to increase the 
burden of debt at an already critical moment, as 
well as to irritate the debtors and even the U.S. 
Congress. (See OAS, 1984.) 
In subsequent rounds of rescheduling, the 
private banks have reduced the negotiated cost 
of credit in response to the stiffer bargaining 
positions of the debtors and criticism at home. 
Concessions have included multi-year reschedul-
ings, lower spreads, longer amortization periods 
and the foregoing of commissions. By the third 
round the negotiated terms were only slightly 
above, or even below, those that countries were 
contracting before the crisis. While the conces-
sions have been welcome and helpful, they 
arrived late in the adjustment process and in 
general have still lagged behind the reality of the 
situation of many borrowers. In other words, 
although the banks made important concessions, 
they kept the negotiated terms at commercial 
levels even though a number of problem bor-
rowers clearly were in need of non-commercial 
repayment terms if they were to effect efficient 
adjustment cum socio-economic restructuring. 
4. The structure of the market1** 
The market structure also worked against the 
debtors. We pointed out earlier that interest 
payments were a theoretically rigid component 
of the balance of payments. In practice, however, 
these payments have traditionally been flexible 
'For more details see Devlin ( 1985 and 1986). 
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due to the competitive market's mechanism of 
default. That is, when the burden of an outward 
transfer to creditors has reached certain critical 
levels, debtor nations have simply stopped pay-
ing. Financial history is full of examples of coun-
try defaults, many of them committed by today's 
creditor nations. 
Default is an effective risk-sharing device. In 
theory, creditors evaluate the risk of default, and 
cover for it by charging the borrower a special 
risk premium on the loans and by diversifying 
their portfolio. In the event of the materializa-
tion of that risk, the bank must confront the 
consequences. If the risk has been efficiently 
Table 13 
LATIN AMERICA: C O N D I T I O N S OF 
INDEBTEDNESS WITH PRIVATE BANKS"* 




































































Source; Calculated on the basis of data provided by the Economic 
Development Division of ECLAC 
"Based on an index of elements of the cost of credit which are 
subject to negotiation. The formula is: 
C, C0 
— + M, — + M0 
( ) / ( - ) « 100 
A[ A0 
where: C = commissions; A = amortization period; M = margin 
over LIBOR and the subscript 1 refers to conditions during the 
respective reschedulings, while 0 refers to the conditions of the 
normal credit market of 1980-June 1981. 
During the reschedulings the banks often forced the State to 
assume responsibility for unguaranteed private sector 
obligations. This deterioration of terms is not captured in the 
index. 
evaluated, the creditor is in a condition to absorb 
the losses. The default, of course, temporarily 
releases the debtor from payment and can be an 
important source of relief, especially if costly 
sanctions are avoided. 
During the 1930s Latin America defaulted 
on its foreign debt due to the vertical fall of its 
export earnings during the Great Depression. By 
1935 the defaults brought a wholesale decline 
—75%— in the value of the governments' for-
eign debt, which was freely traded in foreign 
markets and subject to a market valuation. 
Indeed, some countries bought back part of their 
debt at a fraction of its cost (ECLAC, 1965, 
pp. 29-30). 
Defaults were not without costs, especially 
in terms of the loss of access to new credit. But 
the countries did not suffer sanctions, and the 
loss of new credit was less of a sacrifice than it 
might at first appear, because financial markets 
were generally in disarray and not disposed to 
lend to Latin America in any event. Although 
loans made to Latin America were on the whole 
profitable (ECLAC, 1965, p. 30 and Folkerts-
Landau, 1985), those profits were dented by the 
default mechanism, which passed a significant 
part of the adjustment cost onto the holders of 
debt paper. Latin America's economic perfor-
mance benefited as a consequence (Díaz-
Alejandro, 1985). 
Why is there a difference between this situa-
tion and the 1980s? It is partly related to market 
structure. In the 1930s Latin America's debt took 
the form of bond issues. Bonds were purchased 
anonymously by disperse economic agents, rang-
ing from great corporations to little old ladies. 
The bonds were openly traded and their value 
was competitively "marked to the market". 
When the countries defaulted, the bonds' prices 
automatically declined. Moreover, the disperse 
and anonymous nature of the bondholders made 
it difficult for them to organize themselves for 
the purpose of imposing sanctions, or having 
their governments do it for them.14 
The debt of the 1980s, in contrast, is largely 
in the hands of international commercial banks. 
The international banking market is oligopolis-
1
 bondholders did organize councils in New York and Lon-
don to protect their interests, but they were largely ineffectual 
(1-CLAC, 1965, pp. 27-32). 
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tic, with a relatively small number of large banks 
dominating lending activity. The big banks dom-
inated the inter-bank market and loan syndica-
tion and did most of the lending to the region. 
They all know each other, communicate on a 
regular basis, can co-ordinate among themselves 
much more easily than bondholders and can be 
politically well connected with their govern-
ments as well. Moreover, their loans do not 
generally trade freely in markets, but rather sit 
quietly on balance sheets. 
Thus, when the crisis broke out, the banks 
were able to quickly form steering committees to 
co-ordinate their position and to negotiate en 
bloc with individual borrowers. The steering 
committee is undoubtedly a socially valuable 
mechanism to the extent that it helps avoid a 
panic retreat by the banks and random sanctions; 
however, it also unfortunately has acted in prac-
tice as a cartel. Since the creditors' cartel insisted 
on, and the borrowers willingly accepted, the 
case-by-case approach to negotiations, its bar-
gaining power vis-a-vis individual countries 
could be enormous. This bargaining power was 
further enhanced by the action of the IMF and 
creditor government central banks, which 
helped the steering committee to persuade the 
more reticent small and medium-sized lending 
institutions to join a common bargaining posi-
tion vis-a-vis individual debtor countries. They 
also helped the committee to encourage borrow-
ers to accept an orthodox adjustment pro-
gramme and massive outward transfers. 
Meanwhile, the banks could protect their loans 
from a market valuation because their assets are 
not marked to a market; moreover, secondary 
market trading in those assets is only now devel-
oping and is still thin and very personal in 
nature. 
The upshot of the above is that a modern 
international banking market can exercise con-
siderable control over debtors and assets, as 
reflected in the fact that default has been avoided 
despite public debt service ratios in Latin Amer-
ica of more than 40% of exports. In the 1930s 
massive defaults occurred with ratios at half that 
level (ECLAC, 1965, p. 8 and IDB, 1986, p. 28). 
This also explains the anomaly that in the mid-
dle of their gravest financial crisis since the 
1930s the banks have generally been reporting 
robust profits (Salomon Brothers, 1983, 1984, 
1985 and 1986). Those which have not, such as 
Bank of America and the formerly bankrupt 
Continental Illinois, have owed their problems 
to bad returns on domestic energy and farm 
loans, in which borrowers are protected by the 
rules of the game established in Chapter 11 of 
the U.S. bankruptcy laws (it is unfortunate that 
no such laws exist to protect international 
borrowers). 
In sum, the market structure, aided by the 
creditor governments' overriding concern for 
the health of their financial systems, has been 
very helpful in avoiding defaults and any poten-
tial sanctions that the debtors could incur. How-
ever, this has been achieved by passing the bulk 
of the cost of a problem with inherent co-
responsibility onto one party: the debtor coun-
tries in Latin America. In the light of what has 
happened so far in the decade, and the not easily 
reversible revulsion of private credit markets 
with respect to voluntary lending to Latin Amer-
ica, it is not at all obvious that the debtor coun-
tries would have been worse off with full or 
partial conciliatory defaults and acceptance of 
the risk of significantly costly sanctions, which, 
incidentally, appears to have been exaggerated 
by some analysts in the North (see Kaletsky, 
1985). 
5. Recessive conditionality 
Another adverse factor was the creditors' condi-
tionality. This has been a subject of intense 
debate for many years and there are so many 
critiques of conditionality that space can be saved 
by referring the reader elsewhere (Dell and 
Lawrence, 1980; Killick and others, 1984; and 
Ground, 1984). I am, however, inclined to agree 
with those who argue that there ¡s a recessionary 
bias in conventional conditionality and that this 
fact —perversely consistent with the more fun-
damental problem of the underfinancing of the 
adjustment process— further aggravated Latin 
America's problems. 
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B. Adverse trading conditions 
The difficulty in effecting a transfer abroad also 
depends on the behaviour of the creditor 
nations' economies. The faster they grow, and 
the higher are the price and income elasticities 
for the debtors' exportables, the more the deb-
tors' transfer can be "pulled in" from abroad; in 
inverse circumstances, the more the transfer 
must be "pushed out" of the debtor country 
(Machlup, 1976, pp. 425-477). The former pro-
cess can be relatively painless, while the latter 
can be difficult and unpleasant. 
During Latin America's adjustment in 1982-
1986 benign external circumstances were much 
rarer than one could have hoped for. With the 
exception of 1984, economic growth in the 
industrialized countries during 1982-1986 was 
well below the annual average rate of 3-5% reg-
istered in 1968-1977. The same holds true for 
world trade volume, the growth rate of which 
was considerably below the 7.9% annual average 
mark registered over 1968-1977 (IMF, 1986, 
pp. 38-58). Moreover, the high rates of growth 
of 4.8% (OECD product) and 8.6% (world trade) 
recorded in 1984 were disproportionately reliant 
on the extremely robust expansion of the U.S. 
economy. Indeed, after its 1982 slump, the U.S. 
was the only major industrialized country whose 
economy grew at a rate equal to, or greater than, 
its 1966-1978 average. Growth was exception-
ally vigorous in 1983-1984 (annual average rate 
of 5.5%), and over that period the country's 
trade deficit trebled to US$123 billion {Eco-
nomic Report of the President 1986, pp. 254 and 
370). 
The fact that the U.S. economy was an 
exception to the rule did make the industrialized 
economies' sluggish performance less painful 
for Latin America, because it is the region's 
number one export market. Indeed, the U.S. 
trade deficit pulled in the bulk of the region's 
marginal exports (especially from Brazil) during 
the adjustment process (table 14). It was also a 
factor in the improvement of the evolution of 
the region's GDP from negative growth rates in 
1982-1983 to a modest positive rate in 1984 
(table 1), suggesting to some that a recovery was 
underway and that the debt problem was licked 
(Hector, 1985). 
Table 14 
LATIN AMERICA: GROWTH OF EXPORTS AND IMPORTANCE OF 
UNITED STATES MARKET, 1982-1985 





























































































Source: ECLAC calculations on the basis of data from International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade, various issues. 
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Table 15 








































































































































Source: Bianchi, Devlin and Ramos (1987), table f1. 
Notwithstanding this help by the U.S. in 
making possible the resource transfer, the world 
economy has nevertheless been unusually slug-
gish and the overall trading environment not 
propitious. Moreover, the slowdown of the U.S. 
economy in 1985-1986 aggravated the problem. 
This situation is reflected in table 15. 
The burden of effecting a transfer becomes 
heavier if export prices fall in the face of rising 
export volume. The first column of table 15 con-
firms that this happened for nearly all the coun-
tries, as the increase in the value of exports over 
the period 1982-1986 was but a fraction of the 
rise in export volume. As might be expected, the 
most severe cases are the oil exporters, but non-
oil exporters such as Argentina, Chile, and Uru-
guay also had a big part of their export effort 
frustrated by falling world prices for their goods. 
Brazil suffered somewhat less. Only Costa Rica 
and Colombia escaped the treadmill of falling 
prices, mostly because of skyrocketing prices for 
coffee in 1986. Coffee also obviously helped 
Brazil. 
It may also be noticed in the second column 
that for the majority of countries real devalua-
tions during 1982-1986 were associated with a 
more than proportional movement in export 
volume. However, the corresponding relation 
for export value finds only Colombia and Costa 
Rica with a coefficient greater than 100, and 
then only modestly so. 
Why the persistently weak export prices? 
Full answers must await more research, but sev-
eral hypotheses may be advanced. One is related 
to price elasticities: while they could be accepta-
bly high for any single primary commodity 
exporter in isolation, they could be quite low for 
all producers taken as a group. With the outburst 
of generalized debt problems in the developing 
world, most debtor countries simultaneously 
entered into distress selling in order to accom-
modate the trade surpluses demanded by their 
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IMF adjustment programmes. Primary commod-
ities —which dominate the exports of most 
developing countries— generally may be more 
vulnerable than manufactured goods to this type 
of competition. Another problem may have been 
that productivity gains in the use of synthetic 
substitutes outpaced the growth of competitive-
ness of Latin America's primary commodity 
exports. 
Besides the negative effects of sluggish 
growth of income in creditor countries, it is also 
possible that income elasticities for primary 
commodities have undergone a long-standing 
decline. One frequently encounters observations 
to the effect that miniaturization, energy conser-
vation and changing eating and drinking habits 
in the North have all adversely affected the 
demand pull for primary commodities out of 
every dollar of growth of the industrialized coun-
tries' income. Meanwhile, others have pointed to 
a high value of the dollar and high real world 
interest rates as a partial cause of weak commod-
ity prices (The Amex Bank Review, 1986). 
Another way of examining the adverse 
impact of trade conditions on transfer efforts is 
to examine the region's terms of trade, which 
incorporate the effects of variations in both 
export prices and import prices. Over the period 
1982-1985 the loss of income due to adverse 
movement in the terms of trade has beengener-
In addition to the above factors which are linked 
in one way or another to policy variables in the 
creditor countries, it must also be admitted that 
managing adjustment has undoubtedly been 
unusually difficult because of erratic features in 
the world economy. The first rise in OPEC prices 
was generally viewed as temporary, but it proved 
to be more permanent than originally thought. 
The second price hike was generally viewed as 
permanent, but we now have more reason to 
believe it was temporary. The dollar has soared 
and tumbled in a six-year period. Nominal inter-
national interest rates skyrocketed at the turn of 
the decade. In 1982-1983 rates began their 
ally large. Moreover, it can be seen in table 15 
that the cumulative dollar loss was equivalent to 
nearly three-quarters of the region's total bill for 
net interest payments. Indeed, for Costa Rica 
and Chile the loss was roughly equal to the value 
of net interest payments and for Uruguay it was 
substantially greater. 
What would have happened if export prices 
had held their ground while the countries 
increased the volume of their exports to effect a 
transfer? The last two columns of table 15 are 
suggestive. Valuing 1986 exports at 1980 export 
prices gives a sharp fall in the region's net inter-
est payments/ export coefficient from its actual 
high 1986 level of 35% to only 24%. All coun-
tries except Colombia and Costa Rica (due to the 
high 1986 coffee prices) show important 
declines in their respective coefficients. Some 
countries, such as Ecuador, Peru and Uruguay 
display what might be termed acceptable coeffi-
cients when their exports are valued at 1980 
prices, while Venezuela's coefficient turns out to 
be a remarkably low 9%. 
Finally, there is the subject of protectionism. 
Even though the world trading system has 
remained remarkably open in the face of slug-
gish growth and high unemployment in the 
North, protectionism, or threats of protection-
ism, have nevertheless plagued some exporters 
(ECLAC, 1987). 
downward course, but not before an unexpected 
and worrisome rise in 1984. Moreover, rates 
remained persistently high in real terms even 
after an extended period of world price stability. 
Meanwhile, recovery from the world recession 
in 1981-1982 has been slow and uncertain, and 
the hope for the beginning of a strong recovery 
in the OECD economies in 1983-1984 did not 
materialize. In subsequent years the industrial-
ized countries' annual performance has disap-
pointed and frequently required downward 
revisions of world growth projections. And, of 
course, looming large is the question of adjust-
ment in the North and how quickly the U.S., 
C. The unstable behaviour of the world economy 
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Germany and Japan will adjust to their respec-
tive trade deficits and surpluses, and the effect 
this will have on Latin America. 
The ups and downs of the world economy 
have undoubtedly had their corresponding 
effects on the adjustment process of the debtor 
countries in Latin America. For many, the acute 
instability may well have been entirely unex-
pected. On the other hand, well before the crisis 
there were analysts who had been putting forth 
Any level of outward transfer is technically feasi-
ble if creditors and their governments are wil-
ling to exert sufficient political and economic 
pressure on the debtor country. But as Keynes 
pointed out, large and protracted transfers can 
be politically and humanly difficult to effect. 
This, of course, is even more so if the transfer is 
demanded at a premature level of socio-
economic development, or when a country is in a 
state of insolvency. Moreover, the financial 
benefits of the transfer for the creditor countries 
must be weighed against some important costs. 
For the debtor country, the economic cost of 
an outward transfer is that it siphons off domes-
tic savings that could be used for investment, it 
puts restraints on import growth and consump-
tion, and it limits the expansion and socio-
economic transformation of the economy. These 
costs can be politically onerous to the degree that 
they contribute to stagnation, or decline, in the 
living standards of the debtor country's popula-
tion. Moreover, transfers based on depressed 
debtor economies also can be technically 
counter-productive as physical and human fac-
tors of production lay idle and deteriorate, and 
political problems can progressively create bot-
tlenecks in production. The costs are more toler-
able, politically and technically, if the transfer is 
produced through the expansion of the output of 
exports and import substitutes. In this case the 
cost of a transfer does not necessarily have to 
mean idle resources and stagnating living stand-
ards in the debtor country. 
statements about structural problems in the 
world economic system that were at least sugges-
tive of a possible rough road ahead.15 
"The 1978 Annual Report of the BIS ( 1978, p. 8) suggested 
that the world economy might have fallen into a Kondratieff type 
of downturn. Meanwhile, Nobel laureate W. Arthur Lewis (1980) 
also suggested that the world economy was in a downward cycle, 
but shorter than the Kondratieff type, in 1977 the German econo-
mist Ernest Mandei (1978) first published a work about a deep 
structural crisis in the western economy. 
For the creditor country the debtors' out-
ward transfer allows its banks to prosper even 
while they slow, or eliminate, the expansion of 
loans to the affected countries and thereby redi-
rect their portfolio strategy. However, should 
the outward transfer be won at the expense of 
reasonable economic growth in the debtor coun-
tries there are important costs for the creditor 
nation as well. These involve loss of export 
markets (hence jobs) due to slow growth and 
import barriers in the foreign exchange-starved 
debtor countries, and the loss of investment 
income from home enterprises with direct 
investments in the debtor countries' depressed 
economies. The political price can also be high: 
as internal resentment builds up in the debtor 
country, politicians and technicians committed 
to socio-economic restructuring and interna-
tional integration can have their authority 
undermined by the growth of political forces 
more inclined towards political and economic 
delinking from creditor countries, which can 
include full or partial default on debts. And, of 
course, with sporadic defaults banks face highly 
unpredictable losses, exporters in creditor coun-
tries lose even more markets, and the hope of 
promoting efficient socio-economic restructur-
ing in debtor countries evaporates as economies 
are forced by circumstances into a siege mental-
ity and an extreme inward orientation. 
We have already seen that adjustment in 
Latin America has been recessive and extremely 
costly for the debtors. But the costs are also now 
III 
Final remarks and conclusions 
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rising for the creditors. The exports and 
hundreds of thousands of jobs lost in the creditor 
nations due to recession in Latin America are 
now serious enough to have finally caused con-
siderable alarm and doubt in certain Northern 
political circles about the wisdom of the credi-
tors' current management of the debt problem 
(JEC, 1986). There is also concern that the debt 
burden could be undermining the pragmatic 
democratic political coalitions that originally 
arose out of the debt crisis and which have 
offered such promise for Latin America's full 
integration into the world's democratic political 
system (Bradley, 1986). 
By now it should be clear that there are two 
key ingredients for making the socio-economic 
restructuring of Latin America compatible with 
the servicing of foreign debt: i) the debtor coun-
tries must persist in their internal efforts to 
make their economies more efficient, more 
internationally competitive and capable of 
dynamically generating exports and import sub-
stitutes and ii) there must be an external envir-
onment that is supportive of these efforts. The 
latter in turn involves adequate external finance, 
lower real international interest rates and 
greater encouragement for Latin American 
exports via increased growth of the industrial-
ized countries' output and international trade. 
Without component ii), component i) will be 
very difficult to achieve and all but the hardiest 
societies will, in frustration, be tempted to seek 
alternative strategies which are less inspired by 
current preoccupations concerning the honour-
ing of debts, economic efficiency, and fuller inte-
gration into the world capitalist economy and its 
democratic political system. 
In the near term adequate amounts of new 
finance will probably be the decisive variable. On 
the one hand, most countries have already dem-
onstrated that they are very disposed to alter 
their past development pattern, adjust and res-
tructure. On the other, high real international 
interest rates and sluggish OECD growth reflect 
the need for internal adjustments in Northern 
economies that will necessarily be slow in forth-
coming. Moreover, the longer the North's 
macroeconomic problems remain unresolved, 
the proportionately greater the requirements for 
new finance will be. Without the required 
finance world-wide adjustment will be asymmet-
rically biased against the debtor countries and 
even the best efforts at economic restructuring 
will risk frustration. 
More generally, socially efficient adjustment 
cum restructuring must be dynamic and based on 
growth. This will require a change in strategy: 
the outward transfer of financial resources will 
have to "adjust" to the payment capacity of the 
debtor countries, with that capacity defined in 
terms of minimum acceptable rates of invest-
ment and economic growth. In other words, 
investment and economic growth can no longer 
be the residuals of the debt management stra-
tegy. Rather they must be explicit targets that 
other parameters —in particular the transfer of 
resources and financing— must accommodate. 
There is in fact a growing recognition of the 
need for this new strategy, proposed by ECLAC 
(1983a and 1983b) at the outset of the crisis. 
Indeed, the Baker Plan, announced in September 
1985, fully recognizes the need to promote 
"adjustment with growth". The recent innova-
tive financial package designed for Mexico gave 
concrete form to the stated principles of that 
Plan: the traditional economic adjustment 
parameters, in fact, adjust themselves to the 
need to support a 3% rate of growth in that 
country in 1987. 
There are, however, at least four major 
shortcomings of the Baker Plan, which space 
will permit me to comment on only very briefly. 
First, many analysts agree that the announced 
financial commitment of US$29 billion over 
three years for 15 problem debtor countries falls 
considerably short of what is required to stimu-
late adequate growth (5-6% per annum). The 
Baker Plan has raised hopes, but in essence it is 
still founded on the principle of extracting large 
volumes of resources from Latin America. 
Indeed, as shown by Ffrench-Davis (1986, 
p. 11), the shortfall in financing is implicitly 
admitted in recent IMF projections which con-
tain underlying estimates of large outward 
financial transfers from Latin America up 
through the early 1990s. 
Second, the limited financing offered by the 
Baker Plan is also overly reliant on the private 
banks for the raising of new money, even on a 
non-voluntary basis. The banks are clearly in 
retreat, and with growing loan loss reserves are 
in a progressively better position to resist new 
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forced lending to Latin America. The difficulty 
in gaining the co-operation of the banks in the 
recent Mexico package underlines the fragility of 
the Baker initiative. Thus, there is no alternative 
to strengthening the financial power of official 
lenders and seeking ways to speed up their 
disbursements. 
Third, the Baker Plan insists on commercial 
terms for dealing with problem debtors, under 
the pretext that non-commercial terms will ruin 
the debtors' future access to private credit. How-
ever, commercial terms on the debt make no 
sense for a borrower suffering from symptoms 
of insolvency. The market already admits to the 
existence of this problem, as many Latin Ameri-
can country loans experience deep discounts as 
soon as they confront the fresh air of competi-
tive trade. Even though secondary markets are 
still underdeveloped and the values on them 
therefore suspect, any discount of more than a 
third of face value is a good indication of a bad 
loan. To charge commercial terms for loans 
whose real value is less than their face value will 
merely cause insolvent debtor countries to expe-
rience perpetually high or rising debt/export 
and debt/GDP coefficients. In these circumstan-
ces, and also because of the difficult in reversing 
"revulsion" in private credit markets vis-a-vis 
Latin America, the probability of significant new 
voluntary private lending is in fact quite low for 
many countries. Thus, for those countries where 
the restructuring problem is severe and a large 
and protracted overhaul of the economy is 
required, there is no substitute for debt forgive-
ness in the form on non-commercial interest 
rates (negative spreads) and/or a reduction of 
principal. Banks sometimes forgive debts at 
home (with the help of their governments) and 
it would be wise to extend this practice 
internationally. 
Fourth, the Baker Plan's conditionality is 
rigidly formulated around simplistic notions, 
such as the assumptions that free markets are 
the handmaiden of growth; private initiative is 
virtue while public initiative is vice, and foreign 
investors are unequivocal energizers of develop-
ment. While Latin America would undoubtedly 
benefit from less skepticism of market mecha-
nisms and private initiative, the blanket free-
market formulas in vogue today are based more 
on ideology than on historical experience 
(Hirschman, 1986). Development is a rich pro-
cess in which each country must pragmatically 
find its own way; success moreover often 
involves formulas that imaginatively deviate for 
a time from market principles and involve 
important State intervention. Any attempt to 
squeeze debtors into a single magic formula risks 
encouraging many of them (for technical and/or 
political reasons) to avoid bilaterally organized 
adjustment programmes in which debtor and 
creditor work together in resolving a problem. 
This would be unfortunate for everyone; 
although a debtor country "going it alone" can 
certainly muddle along in a second-best world, 
and even raise economic growth, the widely 
accepted goal —both in the North and in the 
South— of raising economic efficiency becomes 
more problematic as a result of the creditor car-
tel's ability to ostracize non-con for mists and sig-
nificantly deprive them of normal channels of 
finance and trade. 
In sum, what is needed ¡s a concerted solu-
tion to the debt problem that involves a major 
contribution from all parties. The debtor coun-
tries should commit themselves to a serious and 
pragmatically designed economic restructuring 
in return for serious commitments on the part of 
private creditors (and above all their govern-
ments) to support investment and growth. For 
countries with basically strong economies it is 
the interest of both creditor and debtor that the 
finance be on commercial terms. However, for 
those which are obviously confronting the need 
of a large and protracted economic overhaul, a 
degree of debt forgiveness is unavoidable as well 
as technically appropriate for the banks and the 
borrowers. 
Objections are always raised in the North 
when there is a proposed solution that uses non-
commercial criteria in the management of the 
debt problem; e.g., the banks cannot afford the 
cost of providing debt forgiveness; the creditor 
nations' taxpayers should not be made to bear 
the cost of underwriting the support of the banks 
and new public lending, etc. (see BIS, 1986e). But 
every problem has a cost too. There is co-
responsibility in the genesis of the debt problem, 
yet its costs have been disproportionately borne 
by the debtor countries. There is an evident 
tendency in the North to postpone resolving the 
problem as long as most of the costs can continue 
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to be externalized. But as demonstrated repeat-
edly over the last five years of the management 
of the crisis —and most recently in the 1986 
Mexican financial package— the creditor 
nations' "we can't" quickly turns into "we can" as 
soon as the weight of the debt burden threatens 
to provoke major defaults which would internal-
ize the costs of the problem (Devlin, 1987). 
In 1987 the debt problem shows signs of 
being extremely critical even after five years of 
difficult adjustment in the debtor countries. 
Moreover, both debtors and creditors are suffer-
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